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Abstract 
The Balassa-Samuelson (BS) model is evaluated in eight of the eleven 
EMU countries. This model suggests that productivity differentials between 
traded and non-traded goods sectors generate sectoral inflation differentials (dual 
inflation). Furthermore, differentials in the degree of dual inflation induce 
inflation differentials between countries. The standard BS model implies a 
cointegration relationship between relative prices and sectoral productivities. 
While this link generally seems to exist, the magnitudes of the parameter 
estimates are not in accordance with the theoretical model in most countries. 
Since the presumed uniformity of sectoral wages is rejected in most cases, 
relative wages are allowed to enter the estimation. This extended BS model is 
endorsed by the data in every country. Simulations based on these results are 
carried out to quantifY possible inflation differentials. Setting EMU-wide 
inflation equal to 2% and assuming that PPP holds for traded goods, the 
projected inflation varies around the EMU-average within a margin of some + 
I percentage points accross the countries. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Central Bank (ECB) has to 
define its monetary policy so as to achieve price stability in the EMU area as 
a whole. This implies a single money supply and a single monetary policy for 
EMU countries, but this does not rule out the possibility of inflation differentials 
among countries. 
The most popular theory to explain inflation differentials on a non­
monetary basis is the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) hypothesis. These authors 
observed that productivity growth has historically been faster in the traded goods 
sector than in the non-traded goods sector. Labour is a perfectly mobile and 
homogenous factor in the BS model implying nominal wage equalization. A rise 
in productivity in the traded goods sector will bid up nominal wages in the 
entire economy; producers in the non-traded goods sector will only meet the 
higher wages if there is a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods. Within 
a cOUJ,jtry, differentials in sectoral productivity growth induce sectoral 
differences in inflation (dual inflation) but, when countries are compared, 
differences in the degree of dual inflation translate into real exchange rate 
variation. 
The object of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between 
sectoral productivity differentials and sectoral relative prices and to infer the 
potential for inflation differentials in EMU. The relevant point is that these 
inflation differentials will have a different nature. While monetary factors 
explain most of inflation differentials between countries with different countries, 
inflation differentials in a monetary union are determined by real factors and, 
depending of their source, they may call for real adjustment. 
The study covers eight of the II EMU countries. Full coverage was unfeasible 
due to the lack of sectoral data. Analysis of the long- run cointegration 
relationships is carried out using the FIML procedure suggested by Soren 
Johansen. The estimation results are used in simulations to quantify the 
magnitude of inflation differential among countries. 
The BS model is taken as initial reference, but we introduce a variation in the 
model which contributes to make it more realistic. Indeed, the neoclassical 
framework upon which the BS model is built introduce some restrictive 
assumptions. In particular, the assumption of perfect labour markets is hardly 
palatable, given the high degree of rigidities in the European labour markets. If 
this assumption is relaxed, the hypothesis of nominal wage inequality does not 
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necessarily hold anymore. Actually, relaxing this hypothesis has a crucial 
importance to validate the productivity hypothesis, and our theoretical model 
takes into account this fact and, along the traditional BS model, we present an 
extended version which allows for divergence in nominal wages. 
According to the results, there is a long-run relationship between sectoral 
productivity differentials and sectoral price different;als. Moreover, in most 
countries a plausible coiniegration vector can only be defined when relative 
wages enter the estimation. The obvious reason for this is that the BS 
assumption of uniform wage development in the two sectors is rejected in most 
cases. 
The simulations extrapolate past trends in productivity and the results of 
the cointegration analysis. They indicate that -- even if the assumed inflation 
target of 2 percent for the whole area is met -- inflation differentials will persist 
among the countries concerned. In some countries inflation is projected to be 
around 3 percent p.a. whereas in some other countries the projection is around 
I percent p.a. As it turns out, countries with a high inflation history, such as 
Italy or Spain, are above average. However, projected inflation in Belgium is 
among the high ones as well. Germany, France, Austria and Finland are 
. consistently projected to show an inflation rate below the area-wide target. 
It is worth insisting that the model focuses on real factors and neglects 
monetary factors as a source of inflation. In the past, these factors seem to have 
explained much of inflation differentials between high- and low-inflation 
countries. This abstraction from monetary factors explains the a priori surprising 
results that Belgium is among the high-inflation countries and Finland among 
the low inflation countries in spite of their respective inflation records in the 
past. 
How should these results be interpreted in the context of EMU? Although 
in the conclusions, we will extend on this, it is worthwhile to underline here two 
points. 
First, making inferences based on the BS framework may be inadecuate, because 
it relies on perfect competitive market assumptions. As a consequence, the 
conclusion of their model was that inflation differentials is a by-product of real 
convergence among countries. However, there may be other sources behind 
sectoral productivity differentials related to demand factors or to the 
inefficiencies in the labour and product markets. If this is the case, inflation 
differentials are interpreted under a completely different prism and there is a role 
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for national governments to play. Second, simulations are valid only under the 
assumption that past trends continue. Obviously a monetary union is a 
fundamental shock which may induce fundamental changes in the behaviour of 
agents and markets, with repercussions in the behaviour of productivity and 
inflation differentials. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We next present the model 
and derive the relationship between inflation and productivity differentials. In 
section 3, earlier empirical evidence is discussed. Section 4 presents the data and 
discusses them. Section 5 reports results of estimation and testing in a 
cointegration framework. In Section 6, a set of simulation exercises is carried 
out in order to study potential inflation differentials between EMU countries. 
Section 7 summarises the paper and draws some conclusions. 
2. THE MODEL 
Balassa ( 1964) and Samuelson (1964) were the first to suggest that differences 
in sectoral productivity growth are associated with changes in relative prices 
between countries. Since labour is assumed to be mobile between sectors, 
nominal wages tend to equalise. Furthermore, real wages in each sector, 
measured in terms of their own prices, are equal to marginal productivity. 
Balassa and Samuelson noted that productivity tends to grow faster in the 
tradable goods sector because technological progress is embedded in new capital 
and tradable goods are more capital intensive than services. All this implies that 
productivity growth differentials in favour of traded goods are reflected in higher 
non-traded goods inflation. As a result, countries with higher productivity 
growth tend to have higher aggregate CPI inflation and their real exchange rate, 
that is, the relative price of foreign goods to domestically produced goods 
(measured in domestic currency) tends to appreciate. 
It is important to note that productivity differentials do not only arise from 
technological factors. Bergstrand ( 199 I) has emphasised that demand factors 
may play also an important role. Since demand for services and, more arguably, 
public expenditure increasemore than proportionally with income, i.e. their 
income elasticity is higher than one, inflation tends to be higher in thesesectors. 
Finally, productivity growth may also arise from rigidities in market and labour 
products (de Gregorio et al. (1993 , 1994). Excessive wage pressures in the 
tradable sector may lead to employment adjustments in the tradable to maintain 
competitiveness; on the contrary, in the non-tradable sector, which is less 
exposed to competition employers may react to these wage pressures with an 
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increase of prices. Thus, the combination of wage pressures plus market 
rigidities may also account for the productivity differentials. IdentifYing the 
actual source of productivity differentials is beyond the scope of the paper, but 
this remarks are important for the interpretation of the results 
The productivity hypothesis can be decomposed into two statements which 
will be formally presented below. First, sectoral inflation differentials (="dual 
inflation") are due to productivity growth differentials between the two sectors. 
Second, dual inflation induces real exchange rate variability which, in the case 
of EMU, will be reflected in inflation differentials among countries. 
2.1 Productivity differentials and duallnftation 
In the BS model it is standard to assume two production factors, labour (L) and 
capital (10, which are fully employed in the production of two types of goods: 
tradables (1) and non-tradables (N). Output in each sector (Y, , i=T.N) is 
determined by a Cobb-Douglas production technology: 
YT=A,L/K/" 
YN=A"LN'K/" 
(1) 
Each sector differs in the labour intensity of production (6 and y, respectively) 
and in the technology content captured by Ai' Optimization implies that under 
perfect competition the interest rate (R) and the nominal wage in each sector 
(W" WN, respectively) fulfill the following conditions: 
R=(1-6)A,(K-/L,Y'=P REL(1-y)A"(K,/L,),, 
WT=6AIK-/L,Y" 
WN=PRELyA,,(K,/L,/" 
(2) 
where PREL=P,/PT is the relative price of non-tradables. It is convenient to 
express these equilibrium conditions in logarithmic terms 1: 
r=log(1-6)+ar6(kT -1,)=log(1-Y)+QN+PREL -y(kN -I,,) 
wT=log6+aT+(1-6)(kT -I,) (2 ') 
wN=logy+aN+PREL+(1-y)(kN -I,,) 
where ai represents total factor productivity in the sector concerned. 
1 ThrOUQhout the paper, lower case letters refer to variables in lO9s. 
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We follow the standard assumption that capital markets are perfectly 
competitive and integrated, so that the interest rate is exogenously given by the 
international financial market. 
As far as the labour market is concerned, however, we consider two alternatives. 
The first fits with the standard procedure and assumes that labour is perfectly 
mobile between sectors. As a result, nominal wages are homogeneous, 
WT=WN=W. Solving for capital-labour ratios in equation (1) and substituting in 
the wage equation, we obtain the following expression for the relative price: 
(3) 
where c is a constant term which includes the real interest rate and factor 
intensities which are taken as given. 
An alternative specification is suggested by two facts about labour 
markets. First, labour is not homogenous due to differences in skills or human 
capital. Secondly, we also know that labour is not fully employed, due to 
imperfections or rigidities. These matters may also be reflected in persistent 
differences in the evolution of sectoral wages. In order to take account of this 
possibility, we consider an extended version of the previous solution: 
(4) 
where differences in sectoral wages also play a role. 
Expressing (4) in terms of differences, the productivity hypothesis follows: 
(5) 
Note that the ratio ylll is larger than one since non-tradable sector goods, 
such as services, tend to be more labour-intensive than tradable goods. Under 
the standard assumption wages behave uniformly and the last term in (5) drops 
out. The resulting specification corresponds to the standard BS equation familiar 
in the literature (see e.g Froot & Rogoff, 1995, p. 1675). 
In this case, higher productivity growth in the tradable sector will be 
reflected in higher inflation in the non-tradable sector. In the extended model -­
with all terms present in (5) -- changes in sectoral wages might even reverse the 
inflation projection. This happens under the strong condition that the growth of 
nominal wages in the tradable goods sector exceeds that in the non-tradable 
sector by a sufficient margin. 
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2.2 Dual Inflation and the real exchange rate 
The real exchange rate (rer) is defined as the relative price of goods produced 
abroad (measured in domestic currency) to domestically produced goods: 
rer = (e+p") - p (6) 
where e is the nominal" exchange rate and p, p" refer to the overall level of 
(consumer) prices in the home country and abroad, respectively. An increase in 
rer reflects a real exchange rate depreciation. The aggregate price measures, p 
and p", are weighted averages of the prices in the two sectors: 
p=(I-'O)pT+'OPN 
p" =(l-O")PT" +O"PN" 
(7) 
where '0, '0" is the share of non-tradables in consumption. Substituting these 
expressions in (6) and expressing the result in terms of differences, we obtain: 
(8) 
In EMU, Ae is, by definition, zero. Let us, in addition, assume that in the long 
run purchasing power parity (=PPP) holds in the tradable goods sector. Under 
the assumption that Apr= Ae+ q/ T> changes in the real exchange rate can be 
expressed in terms of sectoral inflation differentials: eer = ['6"( Ap ""rAp" ,)-o( Ap"r 
Ap,)]. Substituting (4) in this expression, inflation differentials between countries 
depend on sectoral productivity -- and wage -- differentials in the two countries 
concerned: 
where, for simplicity, we have assumed that all parameters (0, y and 9) are the 
same for both countries'. According to this expression -- provided that wages 
grow at the same rate in both sectors -- EMU countries with higher relative 
productivity growth in the tradable goods sector will suffer from higher 
inflation. 
2 For the empirical work, this is an irrelevant assumption. If it is 
relaxed, expression (9) just becomes more complicated: 
drer={(f,"y";e")da'r" (()"y/8J.saTJ . {f)4a,,-(u.a,,} • ({S'y') (4W·.,.-,dW"H) -8y (,4Wr"4WH)). 
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3 EARLIER EVIDENCE 
Empirical studies have followed two avenues. The first is to study directly 
the relationship between productivity differentials and real exchange rates. The 
second concentrates on the link between productivity differentials and dual 
inflation. 
Most of the studies which opt for the first approach attempt to explain the 
well-documented failure of the PPP-proposition by considering pennanent shifts 
in the real exchange rate due to real factors such as productivity differentials'. 
Using OLS regressions (Hsieh,1982, and Froot & Rogoff, 1991) or the more 
sophisticated cointegration analysis (Strauss, 1996), the overall conclusion is that 
productivity differentials are closely related to the evolution of the real exchange 
rates. Results on the second approach, followed among others by De Gregorio 
et al. (1994), Canzoneri et al. (1998) and Micossi and Milessi-Ferreti (I994) 
conclude that higher productivity growth in the tradable goods sector implies 
higher non-tradable goods inflation. 
It is important to stress that monetary factors play a relevant role in 
detennination of nominal and also of real exchange rates between countries. As 
a matter of fact, they may have been the dominant source of inflation 
differentials between countries in Europe in the past. Because of this, it is not 
straightforward to specify an empirically well-defined direct link between 
productivity differentials and (real) exchange rates when historical data is used. 
It seems highly likely that a plausible model (according to the first approach 
discussed above) should de facto include monetary factors in the empirical 
specification. In EMU, by contrast, monetary divergences will disappear and 
inflation differentials will be exclusively due to real sources. 
These considerations make the second approach more appropiate to study 
potential inflation differentials in EMU and therefore we will explore the link 
between sectoral productivities and prices. However, our study is quite different 
from the previous contributions in several respects. First, the sectoral breakdown 
is different. Second, the econometric specification is more general and testing 
is more complete than in earlier contributions. Third, when defining our 
preferred specification we follow the 'general to specific' modelling strategy. 
3 See McDonald (1998) and Rogoff (1996) for recent surveys on PPP and 
Rogoff & Obstfeld (1995) for a reappraisal. There are other structural 
explanations for PPP deviations. but contrary to the Balassa- Samuelson 
hypothesis. they emphasise PPP deviations in the traded goods sector: portfolio 
or asset accumulation models (Mussa, 1984), terms of trade models (Neary. 1988) 
and pricing- to- market models. Evidence on PPP in the traded goods prices, albeit 
not robust, is stronger than when the overall price indices are considered (see 
Fract & Rogoff,  1995). 
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This indicates testing of not only the BS hypothesis as such but also its 
underlying assumption that sectoral wages are homogeneous. Finally, our 
preferred specification which accords to the extensions discussed in the 
theoretical section above is a novelty in the literature. We hope that it adds 
realism to the Balassa-Samuelson model. 
Since our simulations below will address the issue of potential inflation 
differentials in a monetary union, it is also of interest to refer to a couple of 
recent studies on inflation differentials in existing monetary unions: USA and 
Spain. Cecchetti et al ( 1998) study convergenge of prices in 1 5  US cities using 
panel data for 1918-95. In six consecutive non-overlapping ten year periods, the 
average annual inflation range was at lowest I percentage point and at highest 
1 .6 percentage points per annum. In a similar study on Spain, Alberola & 
Marques (1998) find that the range of average inflation differentials per annum 
among Spanish provinces is even larger, ranging between 1 .2% and 2.5%. 
Remarkably, these differentials have remained quite similar in periods with high 
and low aggregate inflation. 
4 THE DATA AND SECTORAL DISAGGREGATION 
4.1 The sectoral disaggregation 
The Balassa-Samuelson model emphasizes differences between the traded goods 
sector and the non-traded goods sector. The Scandinavian Inflation Moder also 
has the two-sector property. Here, the open sector is the leader and the sheltered 
sector is the follower. Production in the former is subject to foreign competition 
whereas in the latter it is not. This is in full accordance with the BS set-up. So 
is much of the rest of the Scandinavian inflation model as well. 
In the empirical applications of these models, it has been common to 
operationalize the traded goods sector (= open sector) as the manufacturing 
industry. De Gregorio, Giovannini & Wolf ( 1994) calculate, for 14 OECD 
economies, the average share of exports in the overall production in each 
industry in 1970-85 and use shares higher than 10% as the criterion of 
tradability. Accordingly, they include agriculture and mining, manufactures and 
trasport in the tradables sector. The rest of services make up the non-tradables 
sector. 
The inclusion of agriculture is, however, controversial. First, in many 
countries, agricultural production has been heavily subsidized and prices 
administratively determined. As a consequence, producer prices, consumer prices 
$ See Lindbeck (1979), e.g. 
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and export prices of agricultural products do not necessarily have much to do 
with each other. If the common agricUlture policy of the EU, for example, has 
exacerbated these features in some European countries more than in others, 
inclusion of agriculture could induce a bias in estimation of relative prices. 
Second, if the number of self-employed dominates in agriculture employment, 
analysis of relative wages may be misguiding. Implications for inflation 
pressures of a deviation of wages from productivity are not straightforward 
either. Third, partly reflecting features above, measurement of agricultural labour 
productivity in the System of National Accounts (SNA) is particularly 
problematic and differences in the related bias may induce differences in 
estimates accross countries. Finally, in all countries, the output share of 
agricUlture has diminished drastically over the past decades. In some countries 
the decline took place earlier and in some others later. Because changes in the 
size of the agriculture have been so large, inclusion of agriCUlture into any of 
the two sectors may dominate the examination of relative output shares. 
In the public sector, measurement of productivity in SNA is far from 
straightforward either. In addition, prices of public goods and services are not 
determined in a process in which costs and productivities play their proper role. 
So, the data generating process differs considerably from that in the private 
sector of the economy. If one expects to find a well-defined time-invariant 
relationship between productivity growth and price setting, this can hardly be 
found in the public sector where price setting may also be influenced by 
political considerations. 
Given the points made above, the sectoral breakdown applied in this work 
is the following': 
Traded goods sector (7): 
Manufacturing industry + Transportation 
Non-traded goods sector (N): 
The rest of the economy excluding Agriculture and Public sector 
4.2 The data 
The annual data used m econometric analysis covers 8 countries: 
s. This sectoral disaggregation also differs from that in Canzoneri et al 
(1998), e . g ,  which includes agriculture in the traded goods sector, on the one 
hand, and transportation and public sector in the non-traded goods sector, on the 
other hand. 
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Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Finland'. At 
the outset, we wished to cover each of the II EMU-economies. This proved 
impossible because adequate sectoral data was not available for all countries. 
For Portugal, which appears in the graphs, the existing data set is too short for 
econometric analysis. The series used in the analysis are, for each sector: 
Value added deflator, Pi; 
Output, GOP at constant prices,. Yi; 
Employment, number of employees, Li; 
Productivity, Qi = Y/Li; 
Wage sum, WSi; 
Employers' social security contributions, SSi; 
Production wage, Wi = (WSi+SSi)lLi. 
In the present context, four points are worth stressing. First, since we are 
interested in price differentials, the relevant wage variable is the production 
wage per worker, which includes payroll taxes. In this respect, our choice differs 
from that of many other studies. Second, productivity will be proxied by labour 
productivity as most studies do and not, as the theoretical model implies, by 
total factor productivity. The reason is that data on sectoral capital stocks are 
difficult to obtain and measures of total factor productivity are subject to 
discussion (see Pilat, 1996)'. Third, employment is measured by the number of 
employed persons since data on working hours were not available. This also 
implies that labour productivity is output per worker, not per hour which would 
be a more appropriate measure. The matter may cause problems for estimation 
in particularl in countries where the share of part-time work has increased 
considerably'. Fortunately, this is a major concern, among the countries 
6. The data come from the DECO (Statistical Compendium 9 7 /2 ) . The length 
of the series varies from country to country. For Germany, there are observations 
for 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 9 3 .  For most of the countries, the data, however, only begin in the 
mid- 1970s and end in 1 9 9 3 - 95. For Spain. the sectoral DECO data start at 1985 but 
they were augmented with data of the Bank of Spain to begin in 1965. 
7 For some countries, we actually considered total factor productivity 
(TFP) in the two sectors. We abandoned this choice because certain unconvincing 
results . In Spain, for instance TFP indicates a steady�nd permanent decline in 
the level of TFP in the service sector which is difficult to accept. This result 
is probably due to arbitrary measurement of the level of capital stock in the 
non-traded goods sector. 
8 This issue is more important in the standard as model according to (4) 
above whereas in the extended as model according to (5) it is less so. This is 
because the latter model includes both productivities and wages which are both 
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considered, only in the Netherlands. Still, this issue will be reconsidered below. 
Finally, although much of the literature discusses real exchange rates in terms 
of ePI inflation, ePIs can not be used in sectoral analysis. This is because ePls 
are based on consumption baskets which cannot be disaggregated according to 
the sectoral breakdown applied in National Accounts. 
4.3 A preliminary look at the data 
A first look at the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is to consider the sectoral data 
on productivity and prices in various countries (see graphs I to 9). The first 
point to note is that, over the whole sample period, productivity in the traded­
good sector has grown more than in the non-tradable sector, as panel (a) in each 
graph shows. According to the BS productivity hypothesis, this should mean that 
prices in the non-tradable sector increase more than in the traded·good sector. 
Panel (b) in each of the graphs shows that this has, as a rule, been the case. The 
core of the productivity hypothesis is in panel (c). Relative prices of non­
tradables have tended to rise as the relative productivity in the tradable goods 
sector has increased. This obviously gives support to the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis. 
In Table I, the same information is summarised in terms of rates of 
growth for the latter years of data. On the one hand, for the chosen period, data 
for all countries are available. On the other hand, for evaluation of trends in the 
years to come, the more recent past may well be most indicative. Table I 
contains some points of particular interest. First, sectoral inflation differentials 
range from 3.3% in Spain to close to nil in the Netherlands. Second, German 
productivity' in this period has grown slightly more in the non· traded good 
sector. Third, Spain, which is one of the potential catching-up countries has 
displayed low productivity growth in both tradable and non-tradable goods. This 
challenges the presumption that productivity growth is faster in countries with 
lower per capita income. Fourth, in addition to the Netherlands, productivity 
measured per head. Thus, as far as the relationship between price setting. 
productivities and wages is concerned, potential biases will cancel out. As it 
will be seen, our results according to both models are qualitatively very 
similar. This could be an indirect indication that the bias due to the 
productivity measure is probably not of first- order importance . 
9 Note that, for the nineties, the figures for productivity growth in 
Finland are not representative . In the early 19905, the level of GDP fell by 13 
percent within two years. At the same time, the unemployment rate rose from 3% 
to 20%. Particularly in manufacturing, employment declined much more than 
production. As a reSUlt, Finnish manufacturing faced a few years with 
productivity growth exceeding 10 percent annually .  
- 17 -
00
 I 
C
ha
rt 
1 
GE
RM
AN
Y, 
19
60
-1
99
5 
a)
 L
ab
ou
r p
rod
uc
tiv
ity
[G
D
P/
a
m
pl
oy
m
8fl
t].
 1
960
=
10
0 
30
0 i 
I 30
0 
250
 
20
0 
• 50
 
.
' 
..
..
...
 _
_
 ..
. 
.
-
' 
.
' 
.
' 
250
 
20
0 
.50
 
.,
 
' .
00
 
196
5 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1960
 
196
5 
1990
 
Traded
 go
ods, sector
 Non-
Traded
 goods
 slld
or
 
c)
 Re
lati
 ..
.. producti
vity and
 Re
la
tiv
e 
pr
ic
e,
 1
960
::
:10
0 
180
 i 
i 1
80
 
""
 
'4()
 
.20
 
" • 
,.
' 
" 
....
 ,
" 
;,
 ..
 ,
 ..
 -
.. 
, 
.
.
 
, 
....
....
.. 
""
 
..
 "
 
.20
 
10
0 
I 
."
 
I 1
00
 
190
0 
1965
 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1980
 
1965
 
1990
 
Re
lative
 p
ro
duc:1Mty
 
Relative
 pIice
 
tradedl
�
traded
 
non
-tr
�
ded
 
b) 
V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 d
ef
la
to
rs
, i
nd
ex
 1960
=
100
 
50
0 i 
150
0 
<0
0 
30
0 
200
 
, 
-'
 
, , , , 
, 
.. ,
,, 
'" 
, 
, 
, 
.'
 
.
' 
... ..
...
...
 
40
0 
, ..
 ,
,, 
30
0 
, 
200
 
100
 I .r
 
' ,
00
 
1960
 
1965
 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1960
 
1965
 
1990
 
T ntded
 g
ood
. HCtQr
 Non-
Tr
ad
ed
 go
orit se
ct
or
 
cf)
 la
bo
ur
 cos
t (
=
(w
ag
es
+
pa
yr
ol
l t
ax
es
)/e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t),
 1
960
=
100
 
20
00 , 
i 
20
00 
1001)
 
50
0 
30
0 
200
 
""'"
 
50
0 
30
0 
20
0 
I"
 
"
00
 
196
5 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1980
 
1985
 
1990
 
Tr
ad
ed
 good
s sa
ctor
 N
on
-T
ra
de
d 
goode
 sector
 
'"
 
I 
C
ha
rt 
2
 
FRA
NC
E,
 1
97
7-
19
95
 
al
 labour
 proo
uc
tivity
lG
DP
fe
m
pl
oym
en
ll.
 1
977
-
'00
 
180
 I
 
11
80
 
'60
 
'60
 
'4
0 
'4
0 
'2
0 
"
" 
.
.
..
.
 _
-
_
 ..
 -
_
 ..
 _.
 
'2
0 
--
100
1
4
--
- ..
..
..
..
..
.. 
I 
19
77
 
100
 
,"
" 
'98
' 
'992
 
Tr
ade
d 
g
ood
s 
se
ct
or
 N
on
-T
ra
de
d 
go
ods sec
to
r 
c)
 R
el
ati
ve
 p
roduc
tivity
 and
 R
ela
tive
 pric
e, 
19
n
=l
00
 
14
0 
f 
i 1
4 0
 
'30
 
'30
 
'2
0 
'2
0 
11
0 
11
0 
'0
0 
'0
0 
90
 I 
I 
19
n
 
90
 
,""
 
,..
, 
'91
12 
Rela
tive
 pr
oducti
vity
 
Re
lat
ive
 p
rie
e 
traded/
r!2a:
tra
de
d 
non
.tr
act
e9'
lra
de
d 
bJ
 V
al
ue
 ad
ded
 d
ef
la
tor
s,
 in
de
x 
19
77
=
100
 
350
 I
 
1
350
 
30
0 
2SO
 
200
 
,so
 
, , 
, .. ,
 .. ,
,, 
, 
.'
 
....
.....
....
. 
30
0 
..
 ' 
2SO
 
20
0 
,so
 
r
 
"
00
 
1982
 
196
7 
1992
 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 s
ec
to
r 
N
on
·T
radI'd
 go
ods sec
to
r 
d)
 la
bo
ur
 coa
t I
"'
(w
ages
+
pa
yro
ll ta
xes
�/em
pt
oym
en
l),
 1
977
::
::100
 
40
0 I 
i 40
0 
350
 
30
0 
30
0 
30
0 
2SO
 
250
 
20
0 
200
 
,SO
 
'50
 
'00
 
'00
 
19
77
 
,""
 
'96
' 
'99
2 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 a
ec
to
r 
N
on
-T
ra
de
d 
g
oo
ds
 s
ec
to
r 
l:l
 
I 
C
ha
rt 
3 
a)
 L
ab
ou
r p
rod
uct
M
ty
(G
DP
/e
m
pl
oy
rmm
tl.
 1
97
0=
10
0 
30
0 
130
0 
250
 
250
 
200
 
200
 
150
 
150
 
,
-
-
-
�
-
-
-
-
"
"
,
-
-
-
-
-
,
 
100
1 
'L
 
1 ' 00
 
197
0 
197
5 
198
0 
196
5 
1990
 
199
5 
T f
ad
ed
 g
ood
s 
se
ct
or
 No
n-
Tr
ad
ed
 go
ods se
ct
or
 
c)
 R
el
ati
ve
 p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
 a
nd
 Re
la
tiv
e 
pr
ice
, 19
70=
100
 
220 
1 
1220
 
200
 
, 
200
 
180
 
180
 
""
 
180
 
--
"
" 
14 0
 
120
 
120
 
10
0 
80 
LI _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 -.
.J 80
 
1995
 
197
0 
'97
5 
19
80
 
198
5 
'''
'' 
A
el
aU
ve
 p
ro
du
cti
vi
ty
 
Re
la
tiv
e 
pr
ice
 
tra
de
d/
�
tra
de
d 
no
n-
tra
cte
2/1
ra
de
d 
IT
AL
Y,
 1
97
0-
19
95
 
b)
 V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 d
ef
la
to
rs
, i
nd
ex
 1
97
0=
100
 
20
00 i
 
,20
00 
1000
 
500
 
300
 
200
 
,
 '.
 
'.
 
, .
 
'. 
,�
 
, , 
, 
, , 
"
 
"
 
"
 
-
­
....
....
.. 
....
....
....
....
.. 
1000
 
500
 
300
 
200
 
100
 I ..
..,.., 
! 10
0 
'97
0 
197
5 
19
80
 
1985
 
19
90
 
1995
 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 sec
to
r N
on
-T
ra
ded
 g
ood
s 
se
ct
or
 
d)
 La
bo
ur
 c
os
t 1
=
(w
ag
9S
+p
ay
ro
lt t
ax
es
)/e
m
pk:l
ym
en
lj.
 1
97
0=
10
0 
30
00 • 
3IXlO
 
200
0 
100
0 
50
0 
30
0 
200
 
200
0 
100
0 
50
0 
30
0 
200
 
I/,
 
1 '00
 
197
5 
1960
 
198
5 
1990
 
199
5 
Tra
de
d 
go
od
s 
se
ct
or
 N
on
-T
ra
de
d 
go
od
s 
se
cto
r 
tv
 
C
ha
rt 
4 
a)
 la
bo
ur
 p
rocl
uc
tivi
ly
(G
D
P/
em
pl
oym
en
tj,
 1
96
5
=
100
 
350
 I 
I 350
 
30
0 
30
0 
250
 
2 50
 
200
 
200
 
1 50
 1 
, 
..
.. .. ..
..
..
..
..
..
. ..
...
..
..
..
..
 -..
 -..
 
11
50
 
..
 _
 ..
 -
-
;
 
1'
00
 
19
70
 
19
75
 
19
00
 
190
5 
1990
 
Tra
de
d go
ods s
ecto
r No
",.
 Tra
de
d g
oods
 se
ctor
 
c)
 Ae
la
tiw
 p
ro
du
ctM
ty
 a
nd
 Re
la
tiv
e 
pr
ic
e.
 1
96
5::
100
 
>0
0'
1 --
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
-,
 250
 
2�
 
�
 
200
 
'/1= 
..... '�
 200
 
180
 
""
 
""
 
120
 
'970
 
,
­
,
 19
75
 
,
 
..
...
..
..
 -..
 
,. ..
..
 ;
 
190
0 
'''
' 
Relative
 pr
oducti
vity
 
Relat
ive
 price
 
trildecV
2;"
tr4ded
 non
·.�
aded
 
18
0 
""
 
14
0 
12
0 
10
0 
190
0 
SP
AI
N,
 1
96
5-
199
5 
b)
 V
ak
Je
 a
dded
 d
ef
la
tor
s,
 in
de
x 
1965
=
100
 
30
00,
 
,
30
00 
200
0 
100
0 
50
0 
3()(1
 
20
0 
, , , 
, ....
..
.. .. ..
 
,,
-
--
l00
l
�
 
1965
 
19
70
 
19
75
 
19
80
 
19
85
 
19
90
 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
ood
s 
sec
lo
r N
on
-T
ra
ded
 g
ood
s 
sec
lor
 
20
00
 
1(1(1(1
 
50
0 
30
0 
20
0 
10
0 
d)
 La
bour
 c
os
t (
;;
(wa
g
es
+p
ay
ro
!l 
ta
xes
l/a
m
pl
oym
ltfl
lJ.
 1
96
5
=
100
 
tooco
!r-
-------------------------------. 1
00
00 
50
00 
30
0Cl 
200
0 
100
0 
50
0 
3()(1
 
200
 
l00
! 
r
 
, 
-,
'
 
...
... '
 
, , , 
,-
..
......
..
 
..
..
 "
 ..
..
......
 
196
5 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1980
 
198
5 
,99(1
 
Tntded
 g
oo
ds
 sec
t)
r No
n-
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 s
ec
tl
r 
_:
j
50
00 
30
00 
200
0 
'(1(1(1
 
50
0 
30
0 
200
 
100
 
N
 
N
 
, 
C
ha
rt 
5 
NE
TH
ER
LA
ND
S,
 1
97
7-
19
95
 
a)
 La
bou
r p
rod
uc
tiv
ity
(G
D
P/
em
pl
�
en
l],
 1
97
7=
10
0 
180
0'-
----------------------------------, 1
80
 
16()
 
16()
 
14
0 
140
 
12
0 
..
..
...
 _
-- -
..
...
. - --
---
---
.. 
100
 
80
 I 
'ao
 
19
77
 
196
2 
196
7 
1992
 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
ocx:l
s sa
ctOf
 N
on
-T
ra
de
d 
goo
ds
 s
ec
to
r 
c)
 R
el
at
ive
 p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
 a
nd
 R
el
at
ive
 p
ric
e,
 1
97
7=
10
0 
1ro
,r-
---------------------------------, 17
0 
100
 
16()
 
150
 
150
 
14
0 
1<"
 
1 30
 I 
�
 
, 130
 
-
_
. 
, 
---
, 
::1/
 " , , 
---
1'20 
'--
-
110
 
100
 
19
77
 
1982
 
198
' 
1992
 
Re
lati
ve
 prod
ucti
vity
 
Rela
tive
 prioe
 
IradedJ
�
tra
ded
 
nOMr
act
eglb'ade
d 
b)
 V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 d
ef
la
to
rs
, i
nd
ex
 1
97
7=
100
 
200
 
,20
0 
160
 I 
lis
a 
-- - - -
1 6()
 I 
--
116()
 
- - -
.......
.. .. 
---
-
- --
14
0 
I 
, 
__
 11
4 0 
, , , , , 
]�
 
I:: 
19
77
 
19
82
 
19
87
 
19
92
 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 s
ec
to
r N
on
-T
rad
ed
 go
od
s 
sec
to
r 
d)
 L
ab
ou
r c
os
t [
=
(w
ag
es
+
pa
yr
ol
il
ax
es
l/e
m
pl
oy
m
en
lj.
 1
97
7=
100
 
22
0 
I 
i 2
20
 
200
 
20
0 
180
 
160
 
14
0 
12
0 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 sec
to
r 
No
n-
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 s
ec
to
r 
'"
 
w
 I 
C
ha
rt 
6 
BE
LG
IU
M
, 
19
75
-1
99
5 
a)
 L
ab
ou
r p
rod
uc
tivity
[G
D
P/
em
pl
oym
en
l),
 1
97
5=
10
0 
2 40
 I 
12 4
0 
220
 
20
0 
,a
o 
'"
 
'40
 
120
 
-
_
 ..
 -
..
..
..
 -
..
 -
_
 ..
 
..
 -
.
­
.
.
 ,
 
220
 
'00
 
'"
 
'"
 
""
 
120
 
IC
 
1 '
00
 
1980
 
198
5 
1990
 
199
5 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 secto
r N
on
-T
raded
 g
oo
ds
 secto
r 
c)
 R
el
at
iv
e 
pr
oducti
vi
ty 
an
d R
el
at
iv
e 
pr
ice
, 1
975
=
100
 
:1 
-:.1:: .' -
1�
 
.. ,,,
 
11�
 
120
 
,
'
.
 
,
 
, 
,
 
, 
,
-
-
, 
.
' 
.
 
.
'
 
..
 ,
-
-
-
,
 
..
..
 '
 
120
 
100
IP
 
', 00
 
197
5 
1980
 
198
5 
1990
 
1995
 
Re
lative
 p
rod
uc
tivity
 
Ra
laltw
 p
ric
e 
traded
/l!
!!l-tJ
ad
ed
 
no
n-
1rIl
l! e2
i""
aded
 
b)
 V
al
ue
 ad
ded
 de
flat
ors
, in
de
x 1
97
5=
100
 
�
, 
I�
 
'50
 
20
0 
'50
 
,
 ,
 
, 
..
..
..
 '
 ..
 
,
 ..
..
 '
 ..
..
 
..
..
 ,
 ..
 "
 ..
..
 .
-
'
 
..
..
 -
..
 -
..
..
..
..
..
..
 
250
 
200
 
'50
 
100
'£
 
'10
0 
197
5 
1980
 
198
5 
1990
 
1995
 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
ood
s sectof
 Non-
Tr
aded
 g
oo
ds
 secto
r 
d)
 La
bo
ur
 cos
t 1
=
(wag
es
+
payr
oJ
I t
ax
es
)/e
m
pl
oy
m
en
tj
. 1
97
5=
10
0 
:
1 
_
 
I:
 
30
0 
'50
 
20
0 
' 50
 
30
0 
'50
 
20
0 
'50
 
I l
 
'10
0 
1980
 
198
5 
1990
 
1995
 
Tr
ad
ed
 go
ods secto
r Non-
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 secto
r 
'"
 
..
 
, 
C
ha
rt 
7 
a)
 L
abo
ur
 p
rod
uc
tivil
y(
G
D
P/
em
plo
ym
en
tj,
 1
97
6::
10
0 
20
0 i 
i 20
0 
'8
0 
'8
0 
'5
0 
'50
 
' 4
0 
14
0 
'2
0 
'2
0 
..
..
... -
..
 _
-
_
 ..
..
 
-
_
 ..
..
 
..
 -
-
....
 
l00
!""
"."oC 
,
-
-
..
 4'
..
..
 
' 1
00
 
19
76
 
19
81
 
19
86
 
'9
91
 
TrOl
lIed go
ods MICtor
 Non-
Traded
 goo
ds
 secto
r 
c)
 Re
la
tive
 p
rod
uc
tivi
ty
 and
 R
el
ati
ve
 p
ric
e,
 19
76
::
10
0 
1r
o,
 
,'
ro
 
'50
 
'50
 
'40
 
'3
0 
12
0 
11
0 
....
..
..
..
 
-
_
 ..
..
 '
 
'5
0 
'50
 
..
 0 
'3
0 
12
0 
11
0 
.
' 
y
 
'.
 
19
76
 
19
81
 
19
86
 
19
91
 
RaIiI
IiYa prod
uctivity
 
Relative
 p
ric
e 
11�
-.ad
ed
 non
 Ir�
aded
 
AU
ST
RI
A,
 1
97
6-
19
95
 
b)
 V
al
ue
 ad
ded
 de
fla
tc
n,
 in
de
x 
19
76
:
100
 
2 4
0 
i 
i 2
40
 
22
0 
20
0 
18
0 
16
0 I
 
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
 ..
 
, 
14
0 
I 
, .. ,
,,
 
12
0 I 
.. ' 
"
 
' .
 
•
 
,
 
,-
, 
"
,
 
..
..
 '
 ..
 
..
..
..
..
 
22
0 
20
0 
'8
0 
16
0 
' 4
0 
12
0 
10
0 
I ,
 
, 1
00
 
19
76
 
19
81
 
19
86
 
19
91
 
Tr
aded
 goo
ds
 sedo
r Noft
.
 Tr
ad
ed
 goo
ds
 sector
 
h'
 
'
" , 
C
ha
rt 
8 
FI
NLA
ND
, 
19
60
-1
99
5 
til)
 la
bo
ur
 p
rod
uc
tivi
ty
(G
DP
/e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t).
 1960
=
10
0 
�I 
�/I�
 
250
 
20
0 
150
 
--
-
' 
" 
.. " ,
" 
, 
.. -
-
'. 
"
, 
" 
. ....
....
.. -
....
 
250
 
20
0 
150
 
100
' c
 
, 
100
 
1960
 
1965
 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1960
 
196
5 
1990
 
199
5 
T f
ad
ed
 go
od$ sec10f
 N
on
-Tr
ad
ed
 go
ods s
ec
to
r 
c)
 Re
la
tive
 p
roductivi
ty an
d 
Re
la
tive
 p
ric
e,
 1
960
=
100
 
100
1
 
1,
m
 
14
0 
14
0 
12
0 
I 
12
0 
10
0 
10
0 
80
' 
'80
 
1geO
 
1M)
 
19
70
 
19
75
 
1980
 
19as
 
1990
 
HI
IiII5 
Re
lative
 pr
od
uc
tivi
ty
 
Re
lattve
 price
 
Ira
de
d/
�
tra
de
d 
non
.IJ
at!�
 
b)
 V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 d
ef
la
to
rs
, i
nd
ex
 1960
=
100
 
ro
oo,
,
-
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
----
-
--
-,
 ro
oo 
" , I 
100
0 
50
0 
300
 
20
0 
"
 ,
 
, 
, , 
100
0 
50
0 
30
0 
20
0 
100
'
 ..
......-
'1
00
 
1960
 
196
5 
H1
70
 
19
15
 
lQ60
 
198
5 
1990
 
'99
5 
Tr
ad
ed
 g
oo
ds
 s
ec
to
r N
on
·T
ra
de
d 
go
ods ll
itCb
r 
d)
 La
bo
ur
 cos
t (
=
(wages
+p
ay
ro
ll taxes
)/e
m
pl
oy
m
en
lj.
 1
960
"'
100
 
50
00 i 
i 50
00 
30
00 
ro
oo 
100
0 
50
0 
30
0 
20
0 
, , 
,,
' 
, , 
.... ..
.. ' 
" 
30
00 
20
00 
100
0 
50
0 
SO<>
 
20
0 
,
 
'1
00
 
196
5 
19
70
 
19
75
 
198
0 
198
5 
Hmo
 
1995
 
Traded
 go
ods seck:l
l" Non
-Tra
ded
 go
ods lector
 
I �
 I 
C
ha
rt 
9 
PO
RT
UGA
L, 
198
6-
199
3 
a) 
la
bo
or
pr
cx:l
uct
ivi
ty
IG
D
P/
em
pl
oy
m
an
tj,
 1986
:
100
 
t �
1 
i'
�
 
13
0 
13
0 
12
0 
12
0 
1 1
0 
11
0 
-
-
-
-
10
0 
..
...
...
..
 
100
 
90
' 
'90
 
1986
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
1£189
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
1992
 
19
93
 
Tr
ade
d 
goo
ds
 sec
to
r N
ort
-T
ra
ded
 good
s s
ctQ
r 
c)
 Ae
lati
w
 ptoductM
ty an
d 
Ae
lati
w
 pr
ic
e,
 1
986
=
10
0 
I �
I 
i'
�
 
13
0 
12
0 
11
0 
"
"
" 
-
-
-
' 
.-
I
'
 ..
..
.. 
13
0 
12
0 
11
0 
17
 
"
00
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
1989
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
RI/.i6<8
 producMy
 
Re
IalMt
 price
 
.�
.acsed
 noMr
�"'
aded
 
b)
 V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 d
af
la
tOfS
, i
nd
ex
 1986
=1
00
 
220
 
200
 
"
,.
-
,.
"
 
18
0 
18
0 
14
0 
"
"
"
, 
12
0 
.-
,.
-
'
'
-'
 
.-
'
 
" 
, ..
..
.. 
18
0 
18
0 
14
0 
12
0 
l00
l�
 
"
00
 
19
88
 
19
87
 
ID8
8 
liI8IiI
 
ltXJO
 
1�
1 
1�
 
1i*J
 
Traded
 IJO
OdS sedor
 N
on
-T
ra
de
d g
ood
s 
NCIor
 
d)
 la
bo
ur
 coa
t (
=
(wages
+
pa
yr
ol
l f
ax
es
)/e
m
ploymefl
ll,
 1
966
::
:100
 
2«)
 I 
i 260
 
24
0 
.. 
-
-
-
-
"0
 
, 
, 
22
0 
, 
, 
22
0 
. 
200
 
. ,
 
20
0 
.
 
.
 
180
 
, 
18
0 
.
 
. 
180
 
,
 
16
0 
14
0 
1<
0 
12
0 
12
0 
100
 
19
87
 
''
''
 
,_
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
1993
 
Traded
 go
ods seckl
l No/).
 Tr
aded
 goxi
s 
MCb'
 
performance in the non-traded goods sector has been particularly poor in Spain 
and Portugal. This challenges arguments according to which the catching-up 
process is presently led by the service sectoriO• 
The final point to address is as follows. While the standard BS model 
presumes uniform wage growth -- due to sectoral labour mobility -- the data do 
not seem to be in accordance with this presumption. Indeed, panels (d) indicate 
that, in some countries, there are important divergences in sectoral wages. This 
suggests that -- according to our theoretical model -- relative wages may play 
an additional role in the long-run relationships between sectoral prices and 
productivity growth differentials. This possibility will be tested as part of the 
cointegration analysis in the next section. 
Table I 
Average annual changes in labour productivity and sectoral differentials in 
productivity growth and price changes, percentage points 
Differential Differential 
in price in 
increases productivit) 
"'pN _ "'pT growth, 
Period (A) ",qT _ ",qN 
(B)=(C)-(D) 
Germany 1985-93 0.8 -0.2 
France 1985-95 1.2 1.9 
Italy 1985-95 2.6 2.7 
Spain 1985-93 3.3 2.1 
Netherl 1985-95 0.1 2.4 
Belgium 1985-94 0.9 2.2 
Austria 1985-95 1.4 2.9 
Finland 1985-95 2.5 3.5 
Portugal 1987-93 4.8 4.6 
10 For a discussion see Tyrvainen (199 8 ) . 
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Productivity Productivity 
growth in growth in 
the traded the non-
goods sector, traded 
",qT sector, aq
N 
(C) (D) 
1.2 1.4 
3.3 1.4 
3.9 1.2 
2.3 0.2 
2.6 0.2 
3.0 0.8 
3.6 0.8 
5.8 2.3 
4.5 -0.2 
5 COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
The Balassa-Samuelson model presented in section 2, and the preliminary 
evidence above, suggest that there probably is a specific long-run relationship 
between prices, productivity differentials and, potentially, relative wages. The 
matter is formally examined below using the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) estimation method suggested by 10hansen ( 1991)  and 
10hansen-luselius (1 990). 
As the observation period is fairly short in most cases, potential problems 
related to overparameterization are obvious. Because of this, each model will be 
made more parsimonious by imposing a priori restrictions derived from 
theoretical evaluations. This avenue was chosen although we are fully aware that 
it would be preferable to estimate an unrestricted model in which each variable 
is allowed to have its own separate dynamic adjustment path. 
Two models will be examined. The first is the standard Balassa­
Samuelson model which relates sectoral price differentials to productivity 
differentials. In this set-up relative wages play no role. This is because wages 
are assumed to be homogeneous in the two sectors. According to our 
knowledge, validity of this assumption has not been challenged in earlier papers 
discussing the BS model. After having rejected wage homogeneity, an extended 
BS model including relative wages is estimated. 
5.1 The standard Balassa-Samuelson model 
Equation (3) above represented the BS hypothesis about determination of dual 
inflation (�REL =�!r"PT)' assuming full sectoral labour mobility and, 
consequently, homogeneity of nominal wages. The empirical counterpart -- when 
the proxy for productivity is the labour productivity, q, -- of the long-run 
relationship (3), expressed in logs, is 
Pm = PN - PT = C + (yle)qT - qN (3 ') 
This expression defines a specific relationship between sectoral price levels and 
sectoral productivity levels expected to hold in the long run. Furthermore, (3') 
defines an a priori restriction which implies that the long-run parameters 
associated with P� PN and qN are equal (in absolute value). Therefore, we 
combine these variables into a new variable, {PREU+qNJ. Normalizing with 
respect to it, we arrive at the following empirical equation which will serve as 
a basis for testing the BS hypothesis: 
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(/0) 
If the residual, E" of the two dimensional V AR is stationary, i.e. E, - 1(0), the 
series concerned are said to be cointegrated with cointegration vector [I -�QJ. 
For inference on cointegration, three sources of information are helpful. 
The first is the formal Trace test (orland the A-max test). Secondly, roots of the 
companion matrix can be used to examine the number of common trends which 
helps to define the number of cointegrating vectors. Finally, graphics of the 
eigenvectors can shed additional light, particularly when the first two procedures 
do not give a definite answer". 
The cointegration rank, r, specifies the number of linearly independent 
stationary relations between the levels of the variables. When the rank is zero, 
r=O, there is no cointegration. When it is equal to the number of variables, r=n, 
any linear combination of vectors is stationary which implies that each 
individual series is stationary. Cointegrating relations are the eigenvectors 
corresponding to the r largest eigenvalues in the system 12 
For appropriate testing, the Gaussian presumptions must be satisfied. 
Problems in this respect may reflect an inappropriate lag length, or outliers in 
the data, or they may simply indicate that the model is not adequate. All 
alternatives should be studied. As part of the preliminary analysis of the 
properties of the series in full VAR-models, stationarity tests and exclusion tests 
were carried out. 
Cointegration implies the existence of a time-invariant long-run 
relationship between the variables. In a model according to (IO), the 
11 Statistical inference based on these aspects is sometimes complex. Due 
to lack of space, we have omitted relevant tables and related discussions from 
the paper. We simply indicate whether cointeqration was found and report the 
cointeqration rank, r .  All test results and other relevant material related to 
inference are available from the authors upon request. 
12 The magnitude cf an eigenvalue f.i• indicates how strongly the 
cointeqratinq relation is correlated with the stationary part of the process. The 
test for a specific value of r involves the hypothesis that }./,,01 = . . . = An :If 0,  
whereas �I' . . •  , �r > 0 (see Johansen, 1992 ) . The likelihood ratio test statistic 
of the hypothesis of r cointeqratinq vectors in n' dimensional system is given by 
the so' called Trace statistic. The distribution of the test statistic, which is 
a non' standard Dickey' Fuller type (involving a multivariate Brownian motion) . has 
been tabulated for the asymptotic case in Johansen & Juselius ( 1990) . The 
distribution depends on the assumPtion concerning the existence of the linear 
trend (yes or no) . The distribution has broader tails if the trend is absent .  
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cointegration vector [1 - �Qrl is presumed to act as an attractorlJ which 
incorporates an equilibrium relationship between the variables. If the system is 
off the anractor, pressure to correct the deviation emerges. Therefore, a 
cointegrating relation in (log) levels defines a dynamic error-correction equation 
in (log) differences. Accordingly, for each (endogenous) variable a difference 
equation is estimated. In so far as (PR£L,+qN,) is considered and allowing two 
lags in levels - the dynamic equation looks as follows: 
possible constant + possible dummies+ 
+ 11�qr. + 11,d (PR£L+q,J,., + 11,dqr.,., 
+ a [ (PREL +qN - �Q�,),.J + v, 
(I 1) 
A significant constant term in the short-run part allows an intercept in the 
cointegrating relations and linear trend slopes in the data. The long-run 
convergence is towards the attractor defined by the �-coefficients and the long­
run part of the equation. 
The a-coefficient defines the share of the lagged equilibrium error which 
is corrected in the present periodl'. However, the magnitude of 110 defines how 
much of the effect of the present shock (in qr) is left to be corrected in future 
periods. If the lagged dependent variable enters significantly the dynamic part 
of the equation (11, '" 0), it also influences the adjustment. A significant presence 
of lagged differenced shock variables (11, '" 0) has a similar impact. Therefore, 
it is not sufficient to consider only the size of the a-coefficient when dynamic 
adjustment is examined. 
As far as the dummy variables are concerned, in the Johansen estimations 
their role differs importantly from their role in standard regressions. The 
dummies only enter the dynamic part of models and leave the long-run 
relationships unaffected. Use of economically meaningful dummies has been 
advocated because sudden shifts in variables (e.g. due to oil price shocks or 
13 Let us consider two non- s tationary variables x and y such that y : Ax .  
A acts as an attractor if there is some mechanism such that if y departs from Ax 
there will be a tendency to get back near to it. Because of uncertainties. 
rigidities, contracts etc . ,  the mechanism may not immediately bring the points 
exactly to the attractor. 
Importantly, it is not appropriate to consider a vector as a 
cointeqration vector unless error correction is involved. This is because of the 
statement of Granger (1986, p. 217)  on the special relationship becween 
coincegration and error correction : "Not only must cointeqrated variables obey 
such a model but the reverse is also true; data generated by an error' correction 
model . . . must be cointeqrated . "  This is also why we report the a· coefficients 
in Tables Al . A3 . 
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policy interventions) may make estimation of the short-run coefficients in ( I I) 
arbitrary. As this also concerns the a's, problems could be generated on 
inference about error correction. 
In estimation, each variable is endogenous at the outset. However, if an 
a-coefficient is not significantly different from zero, we can condition on the 
variable concerned. This indicates weak exogeneity. By conditioning, efficiency 
of the estimation can .be increased. Of course, this avenue is only chosen when 
testing in the full model indicates that conditioning is appropriate. 
In the present context, cointegration is not a sufficient condition for 
acceptance of the BS model. This is because (5) and (lO) imply that J3Qn which 
approximates (yl9), must be equal to or larger than unity since -- as was 
discussed in Section 2 -- labour share in the non-tradable goods sector (y) is 
presumably larger -- and certainly not smaller -- than that in the tradable goods 
sector (6). Thus, the standard version of the BS hypothesis will only be 
accepted if -- in addition to cointegration -- the hypothesis 
H,: J3QT .2: 1 
is in accordance with the data. 
The inference here is according to the procedure suggested by Johansen 
& Juselius ( 1994). They claim that a structure is acceptable only if identification 
is reached in three different aspects. First, generic identification is related to the 
statistical model. Secondly, empirical identification is related to the actual 
estimated parameter values and their significance. The plausibility of the 
resulting cointegrating relations applies, however, not only to the signs but also 
to the magnitudes of the parameter values. Accordingly, last but not least, 
economic identification is related to the economic interpretability of the 
estimated coefficients of a generically and empirically identified structure. H,­
hypothesis above is a kind of "plausibility condition" which relates to economic 
identification. 
Economic identification is carried out by restricting the J3QT parameter to 
be equal to one and testing the validity of this restriction in a Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) test. Intuitively, a restriction is validated if the eigenvalues related to the 
restricted estimation do not differ "too much" from the unrestricted estimation. 
Each restriction is always compared to the original unrestricted estimation and 
all r eigenvalues contribute the test statistic which follows the X' -distribution 
with degrees-of-freedom indicated in the tables. 
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Estimation and results 
The results of the estimations of model (10) appear in detail in Table A l  in the 
Appendix. In the following tables, the column labelled REST refers to the 
restricted model and FREE to the unrestricted model. The case which best 
accords with the data defines the preferred relationship and is marked with a star 
(*). A summary of the preferred relationships due to this estimation -- as well 
as the later ones -- is in Table 2 below. 
In most cases, the preliminary analysis did not point to any particular 
problems with respect to the normality of the residuals. Because of signs of 
excess kurtosis due to extraordinary changes in the differenced data, we 
included, however, certain dummies". As far as the lag length is considered, 
misspecification tests indicate that we do not lose anything by restricting it to 
either 2 or 3 depending on the country. This holds in later estimations as well. 
In the bivariate V AR, cointegration is found in every country except the 
Netherlands. A look at the data on relative productivities and relative prices in 
Netherlands indicates that this is actually what one would expect. Visually, 
relative prices and relative productivities seem to have little to do with each 
other particularly in the post- 1 985 period. 
lS In Finland, the beginning of the Nqreat recession# in 1991 ( exacerbated 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland' s  major trading partner) generated 
extraordinary outliers to the differenced data. In Belgium. dummies for 1986 and 
1993 are present . Examination of the data depicted in Charts 6 and 9 in Appendix 
reveals the source of excess kurtosis in each case. 
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Table 2 Summary of colntegradon analysis 
Standanl BS: P..w>w. . �n + p,.q,. = 0 
with the a priori restriction IlI'U'L = � = I = �, 
Extended as: PPItEl..PREL1 � /3qrqn + J3�+ i3wRawREL1= 0 
with the a priori restriction J3PW. = .J3QN= 1 = J3PQN. 
STANDARD BS 
Cointcgration Values of Coinlcgration 
+/. �  I\" Il.. +1· 
pERMANY + 1 1.32 1 + 
FRANCE + 1 .82 1 + 
ITALY + 1 .51 1 + 
SPAIN + 1 1.60 1 + 
NETHERL . N.A. + 
BELGIUM + 1 1.00 1 + 
f'USTRIA + 1 .51 1 N.A 
IFINLAND + 1 .87 1 + 
EXTENDED BS 
Values of 
��L � Il.. flwUl 
1 1.32 1 0 
1 1.00 1 .23 
1 1.00 1 .81 
1 1.46 1 0 
1 1.00 1 .78 
1 1.00 1 0 
N.A. 
1 1.00 1 .18 
Memorandum item: For Austria. the extended as model could not be estimated because sectoral wage data was 
not available. Results according to the standard as model are not reported fOT the Netherlands because of 
rejection on cointegration. Lower case letters refer to variables in logs. PUL =P"Pr where PI is the GOP deflator 
in sector i. j = T. N where T refers to the traded goods sector and N to the non�traded goods sector. t/= labour 
productivity. WoW. = Wr• WN where Wi is the sectoral production wage. When testing the standard as 
model, the Ho·bypotbesis is rejected in all countries other than Germany. Spain and Belgium. In Gennany and Spain. the magnirude of !l"r is larger than unity in a free estimation. In Belgium. the free estimate is .9 which, 
however, does not differ significantly from unity. In the five other countries, the standard Balassa-Samuelson 
model is rejected. nus also suggests that there are important behavioural differences between the countries 
examined. 
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When testing the standard BS model, the Ho-hypothesis is rejected in all 
countries other than Germany, Spain and Belgium. In Germany and Spain, the 
magnitude of �QT is larger than unity in a free estimation. In Belgium, the free 
estimate is .9 which, however, does not differ significantly from unity. In the 
five other countries, the standard Balassa-Samuelson model is rejected. In sum, 
this suggests that there are important behavioural differences between the 
countries examined. 
5.2 Testing long-run homogeneity of the sectoral wages 
As the standard Balassa-Samuelson model -- which is theoretically well­
grounded, with plenty of empirical literature endorsing its relevancy -- did not 
find support in five countries (France, Italy, Austria, Netherlands or Finland), 
an explanation is in order. 
Graphical analysis above suggested that the common presumption of the BS 
model -- the assumption of uniform wage paths in the traded goods sector and 
in the non-traded goods sector -- may contradict the data. We now proceed by 
testing the matter more formally. 
Uniformity of sectoral wages in the long run implies that the relative wage, 
WREL =W,-WN' is stationary. Since sectoral wages are non-stationary, this requires 
that they must be cointegrated with a cointegration vector [/ -I]. To test this 
hypothesis, we estimate the two dimensional V AR 
(/2) 
and test for cointegration and the hypothesis 
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Ho: PWT = -P'VN = 1. 
by restricting the parameter in the model. If cointegration is found and the Ho­
hypothesis is in accordance with the data, it is appropriate to conclude that 
sectoral wages follow a uniform path. 
Estimation and results 
Results of residual analysis were generally satisfactory. In spite of this, excess 
kurtosis in some countries needed to be controlled by dummies". 
The results of the estimation appear in detail in Table A2 in the 
Appendix, in which the parameter Porn is restricted to -1, and the unrestricted 
model appear. Cointegration was found in all cases considered implying r= 1.  
However, the Ho-hypothesis of an elasticity of unity was rejected in every 
country but Belgium. The parameter Pow was smaller than unity in France and 
Italy and larger in the rest of the countries. 
For Germany, we also tested whether the value of PWN would change if 
the unification period were left out. It rumed out, however, that the results of an 
estimation which ends in 1989 were almost identical to those with full 
observation period. This indicates that unification did not have a first-order 
impact on developments in sectoral relative wages. Furthermore, we examined 
whether the results for Finland change if the recession years of the 1990's are 
skipped. A regression with an estimation period which ends at 1990 did not 
support this conjecrure. 
Results for the Netherlands have to be considered with particular caution. 
16 In Germany the relevant dummy relates to 1 9 7 0  and in Italy to 197 2 .  As 
in the earlier estimations , 1991 which was the first year of the severe 
depression in Finland needs to be controlled. 
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This is because the hypothesis J3WN=-l passes but so also does the hypothesis 
J3wN=O. This indicates that J3WN is very imprecisely defined. Furthermore, the 
Trace test gave no strong support for cointegration of the two wage series and 
neither did evaluation of the common trends!'. However, the error correction 
property showed up more strongly when J3WN was given a value which is larger 
than unity. 
So, we conclude that the hypothesis of uniform sectoral wage paths is 
rejected throughout -- except in Belgium. As this implies that a key assumption 
of the standard Balassa-Samuelson model violates the data in most countries, 
an extension of the empirical model is suggested in order to take this caveat into 
account. 
5.3 The extended Balassa-Samuelson model 
Estimations above rejected the standard Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in most 
countries. In addition, the assumption of uniform wage development underlying 
the BS model turned out to be generally inappropriate. Therefore, in the present 
Section, we examine the extended BS model as defined in Section 2 above. 
Let us consider a model with relative prices, relative productivities and 
relative wages as expressed in (4) above. Incorporating the relevant productivity 
measure, q" the equation looks like: 
"P HEL = "P >r "PT=(y!e) "q,-"q >r y(" w,-"w,vl (4 ') 
17 A possible reason for this may be as follows. In the Netherlands, the 
share of part - t ime work is exceptionally high. Its role started to increase in 
the 1 9 8 0 ' s .  Since part- time work is more common in services and it implies that 
the annual average wage per head is lower, we are inclined to argue that the 
trend increase in the importance of part- time work is a potential reason for 
problems related to estimations with the Dutch data . 
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Normalizing with respect to (PR£L+q,J, (4 ,) defines the following empirical long­
run relationship: 
where wREL �WrWN' In this model, the dynamic adjustment equation for 
(PREU +qNj is -- assuming two lags in levels -- given by: 
A (PREL,+qNj, � possible constant + possible dummies 
+ '1/Aqn + '1PWREL< + '1JA (PREL<+qNj,./+'1,Aqn./+'1,wREL.,./ (14) 
+ a[ (PREL+q,J+�Q,qT+�WRELWREJ,./ + v, 
As in Section 5.1 above, (4 ' ) and (13) imply that the "economic identification" 
related to the model is only achieved when �QT is larger than or equal to unity. 
Furthermore, the theoretical model implies 0< �WREL <I must hold. This is an 
additional condition for "economic identification". 
Below we proceed as follows. First, cointegration is tested. If it is not 
rejected, we consider whether one or more of the variables could be considered 
as weakly exogenous. This implies that the related a-coefficient does not differ 
significantly from zero. In the resulting conditional model, the value of �QT is  
examined. Two cases are possible. If the point estimate of �QT is larger than 
unity, the extended model is not rejected. If, however, the free estimate of �QT 
is smaller than one, we test whether it differs significantly from unity. The 
related Ho- hypothesis is 
Ho: �QT .2:  1 . 
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After having examined H" we consider more thoroughly the role of 
relative wages. In particular, we impose and test the restriction 
H'o: �WR£L = 0 . 
If not rejected, H', implies that relative wages do not affect equilibrium in the 
long run". If H', is rejected, �WR£L should be smaller than unity. 
The extended BS model is the appropriate description of the data if 
cointegration exists with �Q2.1 and 0< �WREL <1.  The specification collapses 
to the standard BS model -- with no relative wages in the long-run relationship -
- if cointegration is found with �QT � 1 and �WREL = o. 
Estimation and results 
Although results of residual analysis in the three dimensional model were 
generally encouraging, certain dummies were needed to control for excess 
kurtosisl9• As before, misspecification tests indicate that we do not lose 
anything by restricting the lag length to either 2 or 3.  
If there is cointegration, we expect one well-specified relationship to show 
up. However, as the tests sometimes (France, Italy, Belgium and the 
18 This would still allow the relative wage to play a role in the sho r t - run 
adjustment, which contrasts with the standard BS specification. The short run 
part of the dynamic equation related to the restricted extended BS model is 
dif ferent from the standard 8S equation as can be observed by comparing equations 
(11)  and (14)  above. 
19 In Germany the relevant dummy relates to price movements in 196 8 .  In 
Finland, the recession dummy enters in 1 9 9 1 .  In France, a dummy in 1988 is due 
to the sudden j ump in the traded goods sector productivity. Results for Belgium 
must be considered with particular caution because cointegration in the model is 
uncertain and two dummies were needed to control for outliers in residuals in 
1 9 8 6  and 1 9 9 3 .  
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Netherlands) indicate that there is another long-run relationship in the data 
space, we have an additional vector to consider. The choice of the adequate rank 
is of great importance due to the small sample problems discussed above. 
Choosing a "too high" r implies that the tests imposed are "too loose". On the 
other hand, if the correct choice is, for example, r = 2 but we choose r = I ,  the 
tests are excessively stringent and the resulting p-values are definitely the lower 
limits of the appropriate ones. Whether the "last" eigenvector contains relevant 
information about the long-run relationship of interest can also be evaluated by 
companng the parameter estimates discovered including and excluding this 
vector. 
In a few cases, the suggestions of different test procedures on r -- whether 
r is 1 or 2 -- were not uniform. In particular, this was the case of Belgium and 
Spain. We conclude, however, that it is more probable that r=2 in Belgium and 
r=l in Spain. For the rest of the countries, we conclude that r=l in Germany and 
Finland and r=2 in France, Italy and the Netherlands'o 
The results related to this model are in Table A3. There are two columns 
for each country, A and B. Column A reports the free estimation for countries 
in which the result gives a value for �Qr larger than unity (Germany and Spain), 
and, for countries where the free estimate of the �Qr was less than unity, it 
reports results of an estimation in which the precondition for economic 
20 Three examples of the inference are as follows . In Spain, the Trace test 
suggested that rz2. At the outset, so did also evaluation of the roots of the 
companion matrix; one of the roots was very close to unity and the second root 
was clearly smaller. After having imposed data consistent restrictions we noticed 
that the second root had drifted to unity. Therefore, final tests were carried 
out under the assumPtion that r"'l. In Germany, the T·race test suggested that r=l 
whereas examination of the roots of the companion matrix indicated that r=2 . In 
this case we started by assuming that r"'2 but, aqain, noticed that when 
restrictions had been imposed, another root had drifted towards unity. Therefore, 
the reported tests were carried out under the assumption that r=l. In the 
Netherlands the case was unclear at the outset; one of the roots was slightly 
outside the unit circle. After havinq chosen r=2 and after having imposed 
restrictions present in the preferred equation in Table A) , we noticed that the 
largest root was unity and the second largest was considerably smaller. This 
indicates that r�2 is indeed the riqht choice. 
- 39 -
identification (J3Qr= I )  has been imposed
21• Column B is a test on the 
significance of the relative wage in the long-run relationship. The preferred 
cointegrating vector is marked with a star (*) in the Table. 
In a free estimation J3QT .? 1 holds for Germany and Spain. Furthermore, 
Ho which restricts J3QT to unity could not be rejected in any of the remaining 
countries. This indicates that the presence of relative wages in the cointegrating 
relationship helps the productivity hypothesis incorporated in the BS model to 
survive in every single country. 
The final test relates to exclusion of the wage variable from the long-run 
relationship. According to the LR test, omission is valid only in Germany, Spain 
and Belgium. This result comes as no surprise since these are the three countries 
where the standard BS was shown to be appropriate in Section 5 . 1  above. 
Furthermore, Belgium is the only country where sectoral wages were found to 
be cointegrated with a coefficient of unity. 
In all other countries -- France, italy, Netherlands and Finland -- relative 
wage behaviour incorporates additional information which is relevant for the 
long-run data generating process related to the development of relative prices. 
Furthermore, the second condition for "economic identification", i.e 0< J3wR£L 
<1,  is satisfied in all relevant cases. 
The final comment relates to our productivity measure. As discussed 
As far as estimations reported in Table A3 are concerned, a 
clarification is in order. This relates to what is a "free" and what is a 
"restricted" estimation in different countrie s .  In most countries we concluded 
that r=l . This implies that one single restiction is binding. In France, Italy 
and the Netherlands we concluded, however, that there are two cointegratinq 
vectors, r:::2 .  Therefore, the cointeqration vector can also be a linear 
combinat�on of the two vectors . By imposing a restriction according to the Ho' 
hypothesis, we can restructure the data. In the context of France, the hypothesis 
that the restriction implies nothing more than restructuring can be scrutinized 
by testing whether a "pre- known" vector ( 1 ,  1 ,  _23 l  is in the data space_ The 
hypothesis is not rejected and the relevant p-value is 1 _ 0 0 _  So, when r=2 , one 
restriction is not binding and, for the countries concerned, the first estimation 
is characterized as "free" in Table A3 _ When adding the second restriction 
related to the wage variable, the estimation is "restricted" also when r=2. 
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above, we have measured labour productivity as output per head rather than as 
output per hour. This could generate problems particularly when part-time work 
becomes more common. On the other hand, if pay declines with hours the 
relationship between our productivity measure and price setting does not 
necessarily change. This also concerns the standard model. If pay does not 
change, the potential bias is "corrected" in the extended BS set-up because 
wages are also measured per head. Comparison of the results for the Netherlands 
in Sections 5 . 1  and 5.3 supports this interpretation. As it happens, our qualitative 
judgements about the basic features of the "right" specification are generally 
identical in the extended and standard models. This indicates that the inference 
on dual inflation is not necessarily sensitive to the way of measuring labour 
productivity. 
5.4 Conclusions of the econometric analysis 
-The "standard" Balassa-Samuelson model finds support in Germany, 
Spain and Belgium. However, in France, italy, Netherlands, Austria and Finland 
it is not an appropriate description of the relationship between relative prices and 
productivities. 
-Wages in the tradable goods sector and in the non-tradable goods sector 
are cointegrated but do not follow a uniform path -- with Belgium as the only 
exception. 
-In a model including relative wages, prices and productivities, 
cointegration IS found throughout, although in the Netherlands with a few 
question marks. Consistently with our earlier results, the standard Balassa­
Samuelson model is in accordance with the data in Germany, Spain and 
Belgium. In the rest of the countries relative wages do contain crucial additional 
information about the data generating process concerned in the long run. 
-As far as interaction of sectoral prices, wages and productivities is 
- 4 1 -
concerned, there seem to be fundamental differences between countries. If that 
is the case, it may be inappropriate to use estimation methods which -- as result 
of pooling of the data -- produce identical parameter estimates for all countries. 
-For all the countries concerned, we have found plausible long-run 
relationships which describe the generation of the dual inflation. These 
relationships have two important implications. First, dual productivity growth 
has been an important source of dual inflation in every country. Secondly, in 
many countries relative wages have played a crucial additional role. 
Our results emphasise the implication of two competing modelling 
strategies. On the one hand, although the standard Balassa-Samuelson model 
in 5. 1  is a well-grounded set-up, it is fairly restrictive. In particular, it abstracts 
away any role of relative wages both in the short and in the long run. On the 
other hand, the extended BS model nests the standard model. In this particular 
meaning, it allows the "general-to-specific" estimation strategy to be applied. 
This strategy starts with a more general specification and tests whether it is 
appropriate to arrive at more parsimonious empirical specifications. 
In our view, the second strategy is superior to the former which is usually 
followed in the papers studying the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Although 
cointegration is found both in the standard and extended specifications, the 
likelihood ratio test indicates that the former model is generally a mispecified 
one because it does not include relative wages. This missing variable turns out 
to be crucial to rescue the BS productivity hypothesis in many countries. 
6. SIMULATIONS 
This section considers the implications of the above results for potential inflation 
differentials in EMU. In the simulations below, all assumptions about numbers 
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either refer to actual growth rates in the historical data or apply estimated 
parameters resulting from the cointegration analysis above. 
Since the extended BS model is endorsed by the data, our baseline 
simulation is based on it. However, we also report in the appendix simulations 
according to the standard BS model. They act as a set of control solutions and 
allow us to compare the two models in practice. In simulations, we assume 
throughout that an ECB inflation target (2% p.a) for the EMU-area is met. 
In order to set the framework for simulations, let us consider the empirical 
counterpart of equation (5) in Section 2 which represents the extended BS model 
for the relationship between relative productivities, prices and wages with 
subscript j refering to each of the eight countries under consideration: 
where I3QTj and I3WRELj correspond to the estimated cointegration parameters. 
According to (7), national inflation is a weighted average of sectoral 
inflation rates 
(7 ') 
where lij is the share of non-tradables in consumption. The aggregate inflation 
in EMU is a weighted average of the member countries' inflation rates, and the 
weights are the GDP shares, Pi 
(/5) 
Solving (5') for "PNj , substituting it into (7') and the resulting expressions for 
national inflation into ( 15) we obtain the following expression for EMU 
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inflation: 
(/6) 
Finally, assuming without loss of generality that PPP holds in the tradable sector 
so that "PTj="Pr in every country, the expression simplifies to: 
(/7) 
These expressions are the basis for the simulation exercises. The parameters are 
chosen as follows. Pj is the actual share of each country's GOP in EMU; the 
share of non-tradables (8) is computed from the data set. Growth in tradable and 
non-tradable productivity and wages (qTj' qNj' wTj. wN) are their historical 
averages. Finally, each Pry and PWRELj corresponds to the long-run cointegration 
parameters in Table 2. The only unknown in ( 1 7) is 6J>T> since "PEMU has been 
set equal to 2%, so we solve for it. Then, non-tradable inflation 6J>Nj is obtained 
from (5'). After that, national inflation rates are defined by (7'). 
The results of the exercise appear in Table 3. In computations, we have 
used average growth rates which refer to three different sample periods, defined 
at the top of the table. First, averages for the whole sample for each country 
were used. This is, however, somewhat arbitrary because the observation period 
varies considerably from country to country. Second, we used data for the post-
1975 period. Third, the right hand side column in Table 3 applies to more recent 
observations for the post- 1985 period. 
As far as the projected inflation rates are concerned, there are sizeable but 
not dramatic differences between countries. Since the tradable goods inflation 
is common, these inflation differentials are entirely due to divergences in the 
non-tradable goods inflation. The latter is higher than the former without 
exception. 
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When full-sample data is used in this extended BS set-up, inflation ranges 
from around 1 . 1  % (Finland) to around 3.6% (Spain). When the longest sample 
common to all countries (post- l 975 period) is applied, Germany has the lowest 
( 1 .3%) and Belgium the highest (3.1%) inflation. Finally, in a projection based 
on the post- 1985 period, Germany has the lowest ( / .3%) inflation and Spain the 
highest (3.5%). 
To sum up, Germany, France and Austria are consistenly below the 
average inflation, while Spain, Italy and Belgium are above the average. Finland 
shifts depending on the period due to two reasons. First, severe economic 
instability in the 1 990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union plays an important 
role in the post- I985 period. Second, in the latter half of the 1970s considerable 
wage compression resulting from trade union actions generated exceptional 
inflation pressures which dominate in simulations based on post-l 975 data. 
For completeness and comparison, simulations according to the standard 
BS model were run despite the fact that this model was rejected by the data in 
most countries. In this exercise we assume that relative wages play no role and 
use the parameter values according to the standard BS model which appear in 
the first column of Table 2. The results of this excercise appear in Table A4 in 
the Appendix. With Spain and the Netherlands as two exceptions, differences in 
the country-specific inflation predictions are not very large in the two exercises 
according to the two competing model specifications"-
Table 3 
22 Austria and Belgium cannot be considered in this comparison. In the 
former, there are no data on relative wages .  In the latter, relative wages are 
stationary. When the two tables are compared. inflation varies in these countries 
simply because tradable goods inflation for the whole area is differen t .  In 
France, waQes in the non- tradable goods sector have tended to rise s lightly 
faster. On the other hand, after having introduced relative wages into the 
extended BS model,  the cointegration parameter �� increased (see Table Al and 
A3) . The final result is a slight reduction in the French inflation projection. 
In Italy, where the non- tradable sector' s  wages seem to have grown faster as 
well, we do not observe this effect. This is probably because the magnitude of 
the ��u- coefficient in Table A3 is considerably larger in Italy than in France. 
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Simulated annual inflation rates, %, In the country concerned, 
according to the "extended" Balassa-Samuelson model: 
"PR£Lj = J3Q1J.oq1J - .oqN r J3wR£Lj.o(WrrWN) 
share Full post-1975 post-1985 
sample 
Ii "P "PN "P "PN "P "PN 
GERMANY .62 I .7 2.5 1.3 1 .7 1.3 1 .8  
FRANCE .69 1 .5 2.1 I .7 2.3 1 .6 2 . 1  
ITALY .68 2.0 2.8 2.4 3.2 2.4 3.3 
SPAIN .68 3.6 5.1  3 . 1  4.3 3.5 4.8 
NETHERLANDS .72 2 . 1  2.7 2.3 2.9 2 . 1  2.8 
BELGIUM .69 3 . 1  4.4 3.1 4.3 2.7 3.6 
AUSTRIA .69 1 .5 2.0 1 .8 2.4 1 .5 2.0 
FINLAND .62 l.l 1 .6 2.4 3.6 1 .5 2 . 1  
EMU 2.0 2.8 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.7 
"PT = 0.4 "PT = 0.5 "PT = 0.5 
Memorandum item: In this exercise, relative productivities and relative wages have been 
assumed to move as they have done within the period defined at the head of each column. 
0, the share ofnon-tradables is according to the average of the last period. Values of the 13-
coefficients come from the estimations reported in the Tables. The lowest and highest 
inflation rates are in bold. The traded goods inflation, LJP", is restricted to be identical in all 
countries which indicates that the law of one price holds for traded goods. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored the productivity hypothesis and its potential implications 
for inflation differentials in EMU. The empirical examination has been based on 
cointegration analysis of data on relative prices, relative productivities and 
relative wages. The traditional or "standard" BS hypothesis establishes a well­
defined negative relationship between sectoral inflation differentials and relative 
productivities. That theoretical set-up, however, requires that wage development 
is uniform in the traded goods sector and in the non-traded goods sector. 
We first test and reject the standard BS hypothesis in five out of eight 
countries for which data is available. The countries in which the standard BS 
model passes are Germany, Spain and Belgium. Although relative prices and 
productivities are generally cointegrated and the relationship is negative, in most 
cases the cointegrating vector is different from what the theoretical model 
implies. On these occasions, "economic identification" is not achieved. Because 
a formal test suggests that relative wages are not stationary and that sectoral 
wage paths are not uniform, the BS model was extended by allowing relative 
wages to enter. It turns out that relative prices, productivities and wages are 
cointegrated with the expected signs and, furthermore, country-specific 
cointegration vectors are in full accordance with the theoretical priors. Thus, the 
extended BS model appears to be well well in accordance with the data. 
In our view, this is an important result for two reasons. First, the 
divergent behaviour of sectoral nominal wages has, as far as we are aware, not 
been addressed in the literature on real exchange rates so far. Secondly, the fact 
that the BS hypothesis generally holds only when taking into account relative 
wages may shed new light on the underlying sources of inflation differentials. 
The original writings by Balassa and Samuelson explained inflation 
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differentials by real convergence between countries. In their neoclassical, full­
employment context, inflation differentials do not entail loss of competitiveness 
and indeed they may actually be interpreted as benign since the underlying shifts 
in relative prices should improve resource allocation. However, a less benevolent 
interpretation of inflation differentials in monetary unions seems to adapt better 
to the situation of high unemployment in Europe, caused by market rigidities. 
Labour and product market real rigidities lead not only to sectoral 
productivity differentials but also to losses in competitiveness which, in a 
monetary union, cannot be corrected by a currency devaluation. It follows then, 
that the adjustment is born by real variables. Actually, it is assumed in the 
model that traded- goods inflation is common in all countries. This does not 
necessarily mean that there are no competitiveness problems due to dual 
inflation. On the one hand, non-traded goods are an important cost component 
for the traded good sector. On the other hand, higher non-traded goods (service­
sector) inflation may generate wage pressures which affect both sectors. 
Therefore, competitiveness problems may actually exist although they will not 
show up in the ex post data. This happens when, for example, firms adjust their 
workforce or capacity in order to maintain competitiveness, that is, to satisfy 
PPP. This also happens when non-competitive firms go bankrupt and, as a 
consequence, the average competitiveness of the prevailing enterprises rise. 
The relative importance of rigidities in the behaviour of sectoral 
productivity is not easy to identify and, in any case it falls beyond the scope of 
this paper, but the rejection of wage homogeneity shows that the traditional BS 
hypothesis does not hold. Thus, the tentative conclusion is that they are surely 
relevant. Thus, in EMU, the PPP condition may imply costly real adjustments 
in terms of output and unemployment. 
The paper contains a simulation exercise based on the empirical analysis. 
It allows us to give a positive, although qualified, answer to the question posed 
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in the title of the paper. Inflation differentials, due to productivity differentials, 
may well emerge in EMU. The difference between the high-inflation countries 
and low-inflation countries may reach around 2 percentage points in annual 
terms. Because tradables inflation has been assumed to be common in all 
countries, these differentials fully reflect differences in the non-traded goods 
inflation in the countries concerned. 
Despite the results of the exercise, inflation differentials should not be 
taken for granted. The exercise extrapolates past trends, that is, it assumes that 
EMU will have no effect on the adjustment mechanisms. However, EMU will 
mean more competition both in the tradable and in the non-tradable sector. This 
will surely have an impact on sectoral productivity, in particular if the 
underlying source of productivity differencials are rigidities. The absence of the 
nominal exchange rate as potential adjustment mechanism presumably influences 
expectation formation. Because of this, the behaviour of agents and markets can 
hardly remain unchanged because it will be acknowledge that wage pressures 
and inefficient behaviour will have a larger real costs. All this means that our 
results should be seen as an upper bound to inflation differentials in EMU. 
The normative judgements on our results depend again on the underlying 
sources of inflation differentials. If, as it is suspected, rigidities play a relevant 
role in the existence of inflation differentials after EMU two suggestions for the 
economic policy follow. First, governments can reduce problems related to 
inflation differentials by enhancing productivity growth in the non-traded goods 
sector. Seco'ldly, governments should pursue structural policy (related to the 
functioning of the labour market) which loosens sectoral wage-wage linkages 
and reduces inflation pressures generated by excessive wage claims particularly 
in the non-traded goods sector. Both measures would allow a better position to 
face the new competitive environment. 
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All in all, our work should be taken as a warning that inflation 
differentials may persist in EMU, due to real factors and market rigidities. The 
consequences of these differentials for the management of the monetary union 
are difficult to envisage beforehand, but the clear mandate for the ECB to 
maintain price stability for the whole area should be a safeguard against these 
risks:!3. 
23 - e-mail for correspondence: alberola.bde . e s ,  timo. tyrvainen@aktia . f i  
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Table A4 
Simulated annual inflation rates, %, in the country concerned, 
according to the "standard" Bal85sa-Samuelson model: 
share Full sample post-1975 post-1985-end 
/; Ap AP. Ap AP. Ap AP. 
GERMANY .62 1.8 2.6 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.9 
FRANCE .69 1.6 2.1 1.8 2.2 1.6 2.1 
ITALY .68 2.3 3.1 2.6 3.4 2.7 3.6 
SPAIN .68 2.7 3.7 2.4 3.2 2.7 3.7 
NETHER .72 1.5 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.9 
BELGIUM .69 3.4 4.7 3.3 4.5 2.9 3.9 
AUSTRIA .69 1.7 2.3 2.01 2.6 1.8 2.2 
FINLAND .72 1.0 1.2 2.3 3.3 1.4 1.8 
EMU 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.6 2.0 2.6 
Ap,. - 0.6 Ap,. = 0.7 APT - 0.8 
Memorandum item: In this exercise, relative productivities and relative wages have 
been assumed to move as they have done within the period defined at the head of 
each column. 0, the share of non-tradables in consumption takes the average values 
of last periods. Values of the rJ-coefficients come from the estimations reported in 
the Tables. The lowest and highest inflation rates are in bold. The traded goods 
inflation, 6Pn is restricted to be identical in all countries which indicates that the law 
of one price holds for traded goods. 
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